In the ten months that had passed since “Torch” began, the arrival of the Closing the Ring

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victorious Eighth Army from the Desert and the building-up in Tunisia of the British First Army had given us the proportion there of eleven British divisions to four American.

Nevertheless, I strictly adhered to the theme that “Torch”

was an American expedition, and in every way supported General Eisenhower’s position as Supreme Commander. It was however understood in practice that General Alexander as Eisenhower’s Deputy had the full operational command.

It was in those circumstances that the victory of Tunis was gained and the general picture presented to the American public and to the world as an overriding United States enterprise.

But now we had entered upon a new stage — the invasion of Sicily, and what should follow from it. It was agreed that action against Italy should be decided in the light of the fighting in Sicily. As the Americans became more attracted to this larger adventure, instead of being content for the rest of the year with Sardinia, and while the prospects of another joint campaign unfolded, I felt it necessary that the British should at least be equal partners with our Allies. The proportions of the armies available in July were: British, eight divisions; United States, six. Air, the United States 55

per cent; British, 45. Naval, 80 per cent British. Besides all this there remained the considerable British armies in the Middle East and in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Libya, which were independently commanded by General Maitland Wilson, from the British Headquarters at Cairo. It did not seem too much in these circumstances that we should have at least an equal share of the High Command.

And this was willingly conceded by our loyal comrades. We were moreover given the direct conduct of the fighting.

Alexander was to command the Fifteenth Army Group, consisting of the Seventh United States and the Eighth British Armies. Air Chief Marshal Tedder commanded the Closing the Ring

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Allied Air Force, and Admiral Cunningham the Allied naval forces. The whole was under the over-all command of General Eisenhower.

The British assault was entrusted to General Montgomery and his Eighth Army, while General Patton was nominated to command the United States Seventh Army. The naval collaborators were Admiral Ramsay, who had planned the British landings in “Torch,” and Admiral Hewitt, U.S.N., who with General Patton had carried out the Casablanca landing. In the air the chief commanders under Air Chief Marshal Tedder were General Spaatz, United States Army Air Force, and Air Marshal Coningham, while the air operations in conjunction with the Eighth Army were in the hands of Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst, who had recently added to the fame of the Western Desert Air Force.

The plan and the troops were at first considered only on a tentative basis, as the fighting in Tunisia was still absorbing the attention of commanders and staffs, and it was not until April that we could tell what troops would be fit to take part.

The major need was the early capture of ports and airfields to maintain the armies after the landings. Palermo, Catania, and Syracuse were suitable, but Messina, the best port of all, was beyond our reach. There were three main groups of airfields at the southeast corner of the island, in the Catania plain, and in the western portion of the island. 2

Air Chief Marshal Tedder argued that we must narrow the attack, capture the southeastern group of airfields, and seize Catania and Palermo later on. This meant that for some time only the small ports of Syracuse, Augusta, and Licata were likely to be available, and the armies would have to be supplied over the open beaches. This was successful, largely because of the new amphibious load-carrier, the American “D.U.K.W.,” and even more the

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“landing-ship tank” (L.S.T.). This type of vessel had first been conceived and developed in Britain in 1940. A new design, based on British experience, was thereafter built in large numbers in the United States and was first used in Sicily. It became the foundation of all our future amphibious operations and was often their limiting factor.