Much had been made beforehand of the magnitude and perils of this enterprise. It was entirely successful, with no casualties except, according to sailors’ stories, one soldier bitten by a mule. Over eleven thousand prisoners fell into our hands.

During the next two days the neighbouring islands of Lampedusa and Linosa also capitulated, the former to the pilot of an aircraft who had been compelled to land by lack of fuel. No enemy outpost now remained south of Sicily.

Intense air attack upon Sicily began on July 3 with the bombing of airfields both there and in Sardinia, which made Closing the Ring

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many unusable. The enemy fighters were thrown onto the defensive and their long-range bombers forced to withdraw their bases to the Italian mainland. Four of the five train ferries operating across the Straits of Messina were sunk.

By the time our convoys were approaching the island, air superiority was firmly established, and Axis warships and aircraft made no serious effort to interfere with the seaborne assault. By our cover plans, the enemy were kept in doubt until the last moment where our stroke would fall. Our naval movements and military preparations in Egypt suggested an expedition to Greece. Since the fall of Tunis, they had sent more planes to the Mediterranean, but the additional squadrons had gone, not to Sicily, but to the Eastern Mediterranean, Northwest Italy, and Sardinia. In the critical period while the convoys were approaching their target, General Eisenhower established his Headquarters in Malta, where communications were excellent. Here he was joined by General Alexander and Admiral Cunningham. Air Chief Marshal Tedder remained near Carthage to control the combined air operations.

July 10 was the appointed day. On the morning of July 9, the great armadas from east and west were converging south of Malta, and it was time for all to steam for the beaches of Sicily. Admiral Cunningham says in his dispatch: The only incidents which occurred to mar the precision of this remarkable concentration were the loss by U-boat attack of three ships in convoy. The passage of the convoys was covered most effectively; the majority were not sighted by enemy aircraft.

On my way to Chequers, where I was to await the result, I spent an hour in the Admiralty War Room. The map covered an entire wall and showed the enormous convoys, escorts, and supporting detachments moving towards their assault beaches. This was the greatest amphibious

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operation so far attempted in history. But all depended on the weather.

The morning of the 9th was fine, but by noon a fresh and unseasonable northwest wind sprang up. During the afternoon the wind increased, and by evening there was a heavy swell, which would make landings hazardous, particularly on the western beaches in the American sector.

The landing-craft convoys, plunging northward from Malta and from many African ports between Bizerta and Benghazi, were having a rough voyage.

Arrangements had been made for postponing the landing in case of necessity, but a decision would have to be taken not later than noon. Watching anxiously from the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord inquired by signal about the weather conditions. Admiral Cunningham replied at 8 P.M., “Weather not favourable, but operation proceeding.” “It was,” he says,

“manifestly too late for postponement, but considerable anxiety was felt, particularly for the small-craft convoys making up against the sea.” They were indeed much delayed and became scattered. Many ships arrived late, but fortunately no great harm resulted.