Caesar, finding the idea of Lucceius as a colleague slightly less distasteful than his known enemy Bibulus, cultivated him, but the dominant junto in the senate, anxious that at least one of the future consuls should be acceptable to them, put their shoulders behind Bibulus and his campaign (and this meant money). Caesar now had even deeper grievances against the “old brigade”: they had managed to prevent him from securing a triumph and they were to go even farther. The rewards of a consulship were to be found in the year after it terminated, when the consuls were given the great provincial commands that secured wealth, prestige and often fame. The senators, recognizing the danger of Caesar and the ineffectiveness of Bibulus, gave them instead the insulting reward of something comparable to boundary and forestry commissions in areas belonging to the state. This not only deprived them of the expected profits of office but was an open humiliation. Bibulus might accept the position, being a wealthy conservative, but they had sadly misjudged their man if they thought that Caesar would take such an insult lying down.

The old caucus who had so offended Caesar had made an even bigger mistake (and one which shows only too clearly that the aristocratic so-called Optimates were quite unfit to rule an empire) by infuriating Pompey. They had long despised him for his comparatively humble origins and they now envied and feared him because he had made for himself a power base of immense proportions in the East. If Pompey had not been so unwise as to disband his army he might indeed have set himself up as a dictator, from which position he could have ensured that his soldiers received all that he had promised. But he had been foolish—or arrogant enough—to think he was a prince among men and above any of the senators. Now he was to be humiliated. The land-law which Pompey sought to enable his troops to be rewarded for their services was blocked. Pompey, who had ruled like an emperor in the East, who had held almost limitless power, organizing and apportioning territories as he thought fit, was to have his promises to his troops made null and void—as if he was just any other citizen who had promised more than he could perform. The senators who had feared his power when he had his army behind him had decided to remind him that, now that he was in Rome, and without his troops, he was no more than any other senator. For the moment the conservative Optimates seemed to have enjoyed great success by demeaning Caesar and injuring Pompey, but in the long run they had ensured their ultimate ruin. It was these actions of the senate that brought about the partnership of two powerful and embittered men, and the unlikely alliance of Caesar and Pompey dates from shortly after that time.

It seems that either before or after Caesar’s election as consul in the summer of 60 (and opinions differ among ancient authorities as well as subsequent historians) he and Pompey engaged in some kind of contract to support each other politically. Caesar promised that he would do all he could to ensure the distribution of land promised to Pompey’s troops. At a slightly later date, although all within the same year, the two men were joined in their agreement by yet a third—and this was Crassus. This was somewhat unexpected, for Crassus had made no secret of his dislike of Pompey. He feared and envied him for his victories, and he had clearly shown his feelings by opposing the land-bill. But Crassus had now also suffered at the hands of the senate (which seems to have been almost determined on its own overthrow). He had tried to introduce a measure which would mean that the tax-farmers would enjoy a certain financial rebate, his interest in this being solely that they were dependents of the knights. (Crassus’ policy was always to favor the knightly class since he was a business man as were many of them.) His opponents in the senate, the same type of men who had frustrated Caesar and Pompey, were equally willing to wound Crassus for his constant backing of opponents of the Optimates. The concessions that Crassus asked for were refused and yet another powerful man was left discountenanced and angry.

It was Caesar, the youngest, the least distinguished, and certainly by far the poorest of the three, who took the necessary steps to reconcile Crassus and Pompey. The two things Caesar did possess were political skill and sagacity. He saw that he needed both men at this stage in his career, for they represented in their different ways assets which he had not yet acquired. It was to his advantage, and theirs too, to bring them together into a united force.

There can have been no intention at this time of forming a triumvirate to dominate the Roman world, for an emissary of Caesar’s actually approached Cicero and invited him to join a partnership. This was almost certainly an idea of Caesar’s to disarm Cicero and have on their side—instead of against them—the clarity of his mind and the brilliance of his oratory. Cicero refused to join them, not perhaps so much out of ethical or republican scruples, but because he was even more jealous of Pompey than Crassus. This was largely because Pompey’s triumphs in the East had overshadowed Cicero’s year as consul, when he felt that he had been the man responsible for saving the Republic during the Catiline affair. It was a bad day for Rome when he declined the offer, for his influence and his respect for the law and for republican principles might have prevented the formation of what became known as the First Triumvirate. This was the agreement of Caesar, Crassus and Pompey to act in concert with one another and never oppose one another politically.

 

 

 

10

 

Caesar’s Consulship

 

FROM the moment that these three men had decided to pool their resources—military power and fame, monetary power, and political genius—the end of the republic was in sight.