As the first lord told a scandalous tale of British setbacks and defeats transformed into victories by unverified rumors emanating from New York and Stockholm and from an irresponsible tabloid press, Nicolson could feel “a cold wave of disappointment” pass through the House. As news of Churchill’s speech spread across the country, the first reaction was confusion. How could that be? people wondered. The government said we’ve already recaptured Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim! Then people became angry, and then depressed. In a scathing report on the handling of the news from Norway by the government and press, Mass Observation noted that the early erroneous good news about Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim had the effect of intensifying the negative impact of Churchill’s bad news.

Many people expected that we should immediately smash Hitler out; wipe his troops and air force and navy off the face of Northern Europe. The First Lord of the Admiralty encouraged this view. And two days after the invasion the press and BBC proclaimed magnificent victories and rumor ran wild. . . . When the rumor was exploded all the uncertainty came up again . . . insidious, magnified.

What came out of all this? . . . A growing belief that Hitler is infinitely cunning, infinitely clever, and immensely strong. A suspicion that he is some sort of ultra-human devil born to curse our days.

In the weeks to come, Norway would become the graveyard of several political careers and the making of several others. It would prove, once again, that Churchill was born under a lucky star, and it would expose glaring weaknesses in the British military’s command structure, most notably in the area of interservice cooperation. General Mackesy, who had been appointed ground commander of the Narvik expedition, and Lord Cork, the naval commander, left Britain on separate ships from separate ports after receiving separate briefings. General Mackesy received his from General Ironside; Lord Cork, his from the first sea lord, Dudley Pound, and a second briefing from Churchill, in the backseat of the first lord’s car just as Cork was about to depart for Norway. Then, amid Admiralty complaints that it had no information about the ground plan for Narvik, War Office complaints that it had no information about the naval plan for Narvik, and Mackesy’s and Cork’s complaints about each other, the war cabinet would decide that Narvik was not that important after all. The Norwegian government wanted first priority given to Trondheim, and Chamberlain and Lord Halifax were inclined to agree with the Norwegians. Churchill half agreed.

At 1:00 a.m. on April 12, General Ironside heard a knock on the door. When he opened it, Churchill was standing in the doorway. Behind the first lord were the first sea lord, Dudley Pound; the first sea lord’s deputy, Admiral Phillips; and the air chief marshal, Cyril Newall. Ironside, who was six feet four, stood in the half light of the doorway, examining his guests, the tallest of whom was a half head shorter than he. “Tiny” Ironside was not a man easily intimidated. He had faced down the Boers in the Boer War, the Germans in the Great War, the Red Army in revolutionary Russia, and innumerable War Office officials. Still, Ironside knew from experience that late-night visits generally brought trouble, and late-night visits involving Churchill generally brought serious trouble. “Tiny,” the first lord said, “I want several of the battalions earmarked for the assault on Narvik diverted south to stake a claim on Trondheim.” Ironside, who as chief of the Imperial General Staff had to approve the request, said no. “A convoy packed in one place is not suitable for landing in another.” After an often heated argument, Churchill went home frustrated, and Ironside, who was acquainted with the first lord’s determination, went to bed uneasy. “I shall not get much sleep tonight,” he wrote in his diary.

On the fourteenth, Churchill again made a late-night visit to the general. “Tiny,” he said, “we are going to the wrong place. We should go for Trondheim.” In the past seventy-two hours, the Royal Navy had scored a series of spectacular victories in the waters around Narvik; and with the town now seemingly on the edge of recapture, Churchill believed that British forces could be safely diverted to the Trondheim operation. “The Navy will make a direct attack on [Trondheim],” he said.