The chronicler Ernoul, or Arnold of Ibelino (who would have had no reason to invent such a story) states specifically that the Sultan “sent envoys to Venice and told the Venetians that, if they could prevent the Christians attacking his country, he would give them ample reward…” Ernoul further goes on to say that “He wished the Doge and the Venetians both health and friendship—and to prove it sent them a great variety of presents. He further guaranteed that, if they could prevent the Franks [the Crusaders] from attacking Egypt, he would pay them a considerable sum and would ensure that they had very advantageous trading concessions at the port of Alexandria.”[4]

There is no longer any great mystery about the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, once one has seen how very much Venice stood to gain by preventing the Crusaders from ever reaching its objective. When this is coupled with the fact that the leader of the Crusade, Boniface of Montferrat, was in agreement with Philip of Swabia to divert the Crusade to Constantinople if it were at all possible—then the pattern of events becomes immediately clear.

Not all the Crusaders were willing to wait while the negotiations over transport were settled with Venice. A Flemish squadron under John of Nesle sailed and reached Acre in the winter of 1202, while yet another group set out independently from Marseilles. Some individuals even made their own charter arrangements, rather than wait for the main body of the Crusade to assemble. Nevertheless, these independent groups were only a fraction of the great army that was gathering throughout Europe—and which was to be dependent solely upon Venice for its transport to the Near East. Most of the Crusaders did not even know that Egypt had been decided upon by their leaders as the main point of attack. A great many of them believed that Syria was to be the objective. Some of them disagreed violently in the choice of Egypt, and tried to make their own way to Syria. It was these latter whom Villehardouin so harshly castigated as having splintered the Crusade. Certainly, the ‘pro-Syria’ party was die cause of many of the arguments and dissension that broke out when the army was finally encamped at Venice.

So, gradually throughout the years 1202-3, the majority of the Crusaders and men-at-arms made their way through Europe, most of them taking the route over the Alps by Mont Cenis, and across Lombardy to Venice. It was the failure of many of the knights to arrive at Venice on time, or to make their own arrangements and sail from other ports of embarkation, which caused grave concern to the leaders of the Crusade. They realised that they would be unable to fulfil their promises to the Venetians as to the number of men and horses that would need transport, and they would therefore be unable to pay the sum that had been agreed. Since they had borrowed 5,000 silver marks from Venetian money-lenders on their first visit to the city—so that the boat-builders could begin their work—they were now in a similar position to a shipping company that has begun to build a 40,000-ton liner and suddenly realises that a 10,000-ton vessel would have been big enough.

It was hardly surprising that men like Villehardouin became embittered against the groups of knights who had already sailed from Flanders, or who were now making their own private arrangements in other ports of Europe. Villehardouin himself, in company with a number of other senior knights, was despatched to induce some of the reluctant, or independent-minded, Crusaders to come to Venice. Villehardouin, for instance, was successful in persuading Count Louis de Blois to join up with the main body and not proceed independently.

While Villehardouin and other members of the inner council were increasingly concerned at the situation in which they found themselves-, a simple Crusader like Robert de Clari could only marvel at the sight of the fleet that was in preparation: “When the Crusaders were all assembled at Venice and saw the great fleet which had been built—the fine merchantmen, warships, transports to carry the horses, and the galleys, they were amazed—almost as much as they were at the great richness of the city. Now when they saw that there was not room for them all in Venice, they decided to go and encamp on the island of Saint Nicholas, which is a league from Venice and entirely surrounded by sea…”

It was at this point that their troubles really started. Nothing could have pleased the Doge more than that the bulk of the Crusading army should be located in one place, and cut off from his city. He had no more desire to have this host of soldiers quartered in Venice itself than have many other rulers in subsequent centuries who have seen ‘armies of liberation’ descending upon their capitals. But now, as Villehardouin records, “The Venetians had faithfully fulfilled their part of the bargain—indeed they had built more ships than was necessary. So, being ready to start, they asked the counts and barons to fulfil their part of the bargain and pay the money that was owing.”

A great number of the Crusaders had run out of funds and in their turn looked to the senior knights to help them. “The barons accordingly took from each man as much as he could afford to pay. But even so, after everyone had made some contribution or other, the total sum collected from the army did not amount to half—let alone the whole—of the sum that had been agreed upon.”

Doge Dandolo was one of the most astute men of his age. It is difficult to believe that he had not always foreseen that something of this sort was likely to occur. Venice had been familiar with Crusaders and their financial problems for two centuries. Not only were there always defections from their ranks, individuals who decided at the last moment to make their own arrangements, but the average crusader—particularly the common man-at-arms—was invariably short of money. As the Doge knew, this was one of the reasons that may well have driven him to join the Crusade in the first place. Certainly all Crusaders hoped to recoup their expenditure—and make a profit during the campaign itself. Was it by chance, then, that the Venetians appear to have built many more ships than were ever likely to have been required? There was “So great a number of warships, galleys and transports that they could well have accommodated three times as many men as there were in the whole army”.

In the discussions that followed among the barons, there were many who were in favour of abandoning the idea of a centralised expedition, and of making their way individually to Egypt or Syria. Naturally their leaders were against any such notion, for to disband the Crusading army would be to render any major attack on Egypt an impossibility.