Prime Minister of

18 Jan. 42

Australia to Prime

Minister

I do not understand how you can read into my telegram any expression of opinion that we expected the whole of Malaya to be defended without superiority of sea-power.

2. On the contrary, if you refer to the Australian Government’s cable of December 1, 1941, on the report of the first Singapore Conference you will read the following, which unfortunately has proved rather too true a forecast:

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“The general conclusion reached by the delegation was that in the absence of a main fleet in the Far East the forces and equipment at present available in this area for the defence of Malaya are totally inadequate to meet a major attack by Japan.”

3. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff laid down the strengths of:

(i) Land forces considered necessary for the defence of Malaya.

(ii) The total quantity of equipment to be provided for the forces in (i).

(iii) The air forces required “to give a fair degree of security” to Malaya.

4. We have contributed what we could in land and air forces and material to this region and consistently pressed for the strengthening of the defences, but there have been suggestions of complacency with the position which have not been justified by the speedy progress of the Japanese. That is why I said in my telegram [of December 5] these events were disturbing….

6. As far back as 1937 the Commonwealth Government received assurances that it was the aim of the United Kingdom Government to make Singapore impregnable. When the defence of Singapore was under survey by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1933 the [Australian] High Commissioner pointed out the grave effects that would flow from the loss of Singapore or the denial of its use to the main fleet. He stated that in the last resort the whole internal defence system of Australia was based on the integrity of Singapore and the presence of a capital fleet there. He added that, if this was not a reasonable possibility, Australia, in balancing a doubtful naval security against invasion, would have to provide for greater land and air forces as a deterrent against such risk. I repeat these earlier facts to make quite clear the conception of the The Hinge of Fate

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Empire and local defence in which we have been brought to believe. It has also influenced our decision on co-operation in other theatres from the relatively small resources we possess in relation to our commitments in a Pacific war.

7. My observations on Crete and Greece imply no censure on you, nor am I passing judgment on anyone, but there is no denying the fact that air support was not on the scale promised…. I have stated this position frankly to the Australian people because I believe it is better that they should know the facts than assume that all is well and later be disillusioned by the truth.

8. No one has a greater admiration for the magnificent efforts of the people of the United Kingdom than their kinsfolk in Australia. Nevertheless, we make no apologies for our effort, or even for what you argue we are not doing. The various parts of the Empire, as you know, are differently situated, possess various resources, and have their own peculiar problems.

It was my duty to make the fullest allowance for the alarm which racked the Commonwealth Government and the dangers which beset them. I could not however forbear a reference to the strong support which Australian political parties, particularly the Labour Party, had given before the war both to the neglect of our defences and to the policy of appeasement. As this telegram sums up the position I felt myself entitled to take, it should be printed here.

Prime Minister to Mr.

19 Jan. 42

Curtin

I thank you for your frank expression of views.