Our mobile forces tried by moving round the Desert Flank to block his withdrawal along the coast roads leading to Benghazi. Bad weather, rough going, and above all maintenance difficulties caused this attempt to fail, and the enemy columns, though hard pressed, reached Benghazi, pursued by the 4th British-Indian Division. The enemy’s armour withdrew by the desert route through Mechili, followed by the 7th Armoured Division, reinforced later by the Guards Brigade.

It was hoped to repeat the success achieved a year before, when the Italian retreat southward from Benghazi had been cut off by a swift advance to Antelat and a great haul of prisoners taken. It was found impossible however to supply in time a strong enough force, and the enemy were fully aware of their danger of being caught a second time. When therefore our leading troops reached Antelat, they found it firmly held and could make no headway. Behind this shield Rommel withdrew all his forces to Agedabia, which he held

The Hinge of Fate

39

against our attacks while preparing the strong Agheila position to which he withdrew unmolested on January 7.

The XIIIth Corps were now at the extreme end of their administrative tether. There was an unfortunate delay, ascribed to bad weather and enemy air interference, in bringing the port of Benghazi into working order. Supplies for the forward troops had therefore to be brought by road from Tobruk, and not much was accumulated.

Consequently the 4th Indian Division could not be brought south from Benghazi, and our forces facing the enemy at Agheila consisted only of the Guards Brigade and the 7th Armoured Division, which in mid-January was relieved by the 1st Armoured Division, newly arrived from home. For some time these troops were neither rendered strong enough to attack nor occupied in preparing a defensive system against a counter-stroke.

The military disaster which, for the second time, at this same fatal corner and one year later, was to ruin the whole British campaign in the Desert for 1942 requires a precise account of what actually happened in this fateful month of January.

On January 9 General Auchinleck, after describing his dispositions, cabled to me at Washington as follows: Following is forecast of possible enemy action. Stand on line Agheila-Marada. Xth Italian Corps, with Brescia and Pavia Divisions, to hold Agheila area, stiffened by elements German 90th Light Division. Italian Mobile Corps, with Trento and Trieste Divisions and elements German 90th Light Division, at Marada to prevent envelopment Agheila by us from south. German 15th and 21st Armoured The Hinge of Fate

40

Divisions and possibly Ariete Armoured Division in reserve for counter-attack purposes.

And the next day:

Yesterday Guards Brigade Group (two battalions) still held up by enemy in position twelve miles southwest of Agedabia.

It was not difficult for me, with my map room at the White House functioning, to see what these innocent-looking telegrams meant.

Prime Minister to

11 Jan. 42

General Auchinleck

I fear this means that the bulk of seven and a half enemy divisions have got away round the corner, and will now be retreating directly along their communications. I note also that nine merchant ships of 10,000

tons are reported to have reached Tripoli safely. It was understood that you believed your advance down the El Abd track would certainly cut off Rommel’s Italian infantry, but now it appears they are out of the net. How does this all affect “Acrobat” [the advance into Tripoli]? I am sure you and your armies did all in human power, but we must face the facts as they are, which greatly influence both “Gymnast” and “Super-Gymnast.”

Here must be noted once more the dominating influence of the war at sea on the fortunes of the Eighth Army. The disaster to Force K (the Malta squadron), involving the loss of the cruiser Neptune in the minefield off Tripoli on December 19, had enabled the enemy convoy with its vital supplies to get through and replenish Rommel’s armies at a critical moment.

“Gymnast,” it will be remembered, was our plan to send aid to General Weygand in French North Africa, if he would The Hinge of Fate

41

accept it. For this we held one armoured and three field divisions in readiness to embark at short notice from England, and a considerable air contingent. Neither Weygand nor Vichy had responded favourably to our overtures, but we had always hoped that the decisive defeat of Rommel and an advance into Tripoli on the long road to Tunis might encourage one or both to take the plunge. “Super-Gymnast” was the far larger scheme of British and American intervention in French North Africa, to which I had already found President Roosevelt most responsive, and which I had set forth in my paper of December 16 as the main Anglo-American amphibious operation in the West for the campaign of 1942.