These, as you know, were weak and were pushed aside from main road…. Once again Rommel has made a bold stroke…. His unexpected initial success probably encouraged him, as happened last year, to go farther than he originally intended. But his supply position this time is in no way comparable with last year, when he also had fresh troops. The situation has not developed quite as I should have liked, but I hope to turn it to our ultimate advantage.

Here however was the shock. A Service message arrived late on the 24th:

Naval Liaison Officer

24 Jan. 42

Eighth Army to C.-in-

C. Mediterranean

Preparations to evacuate Benghazi are being made as a precautionary measure only. Demolition work is not being ordered yet. Non-fighting personnel in the circumstances are being moved eastward as far as possible by night…. Should Benghazi fall, Derna will follow.

This led me to send the following to General Auchinleck, from whom I had as yet heard nothing of the sort: The Hinge of Fate

48

Prime Minister to

25 Jan. 42

General Auchinleck

I am much disturbed by the report from the Eighth Army, which speaks of evacuation of Benghazi and Derna. I had certainly never been led to suppose that such a situation could arise. All this movement of non-fighting personnel eastward, and statement that demolition work at Benghazi has not been ordered yet, places the campaign on different level from any we had considered. Have you really had a heavy defeat in the Antelat area? Has our fresh armour been unable to compete with the resuscitated German tanks? It seems to me this is a serious crisis, and one to me quite unexpected. Why should they all be off so quickly? Why should not the 4th [British-] Indian Division hold out at Benghazi, like the Huns at Halfaya? The kind of retirement now evidently envisaged by subordinate officers implies the failure of “Crusader” and the ruin of

“Acrobat.” 2

Auchinleck rightly hastened to General Ritchie’s advanced headquarters.

General Auchinleck

26 Jan. 42

to Prime Minister

I flew here from Cairo yesterday. Position is not satisfactory owing to apparent inability of 1st Armoured Division and Guards Brigade Group [to] stabilise situation in spite of hard fighting. Enemy yesterday pushed our troops back to Msus and beyond, though yesterday evening retiring columns still cast of this place were apparently engaged with enemy. 3…

4. Heavy installations and base establishments have been moved from Benghazi as precautionary measure with my approval. General Ritchie has taken 4th Indian Division under his direct control, and ordered it to strike south from Benghazi as strongly as possible, using mixed columns against enemy communications and

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49

flank about Antelat. 1st Armoured Division is to do everything possible to hold enemy south [of] Charruba and west of Mechili and protect flank of 4th Indian Division.

5. Enemy formations identified as having been engaged are 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, Ariete Division, and 90th Light Division.

Rommel, having established his main force at Msus, had the option of striking northwest to Benghazi or northeast towards Mechili. He did both.