The Labour Government, with its majority of two, monopolised the whole executive power, and conscription even for home defence was banned.

These partisan decisions did less than justice to the spirit of the Australian nation, and made more difficult our task in providing, so far as possible, for their security while observing a true sense of proportion in world strategy.

The sombre pages of this volume must open with my correspondence with the Australian Prime Minister, Mr.

Curtin. Our discussions about the relief of the Australian troops in Tobruk had not been agreeable. Later in the war, in easier times, when he came over to England and we all got to know him well, there was general respect and liking for this eminent and striking Australian personality, and I personally formed with him a friendship which, alas, was cut short by his untimely death. At this moment however, when pressures from all sides were so fierce, I was too conscious of the depth and number of the differences in outlook that divided us, and I regret any traces of impatience which my telegrams may bear.

While in Washington I received a series of messages from Mr. Curtin and Dr. Evatt, Australian Minister for External The Hinge of Fate

20

Affairs, through their representative in Washington, Mr.

Casey. Mr. Curtin also sent the following telegram to President Roosevelt.

26 Dec. 41

At this time of great crisis I desire to address you both while you are conferring for the purpose of advancing our common cause.

2. I have already addressed a communication to Mr.

Churchill on the question of Russia, which I regard as of great importance in relation to the war with Japan, and which I hope will receive the consideration of you both during the conference.

3. I refer now to a matter of more pressing importance.

4. From all reports it is very evident that in North Malaya the Japanese have assumed control of air and sea. The small British army there includes one Australian division, and we have sent three air squadrons to Malaya and two to the Netherlands East Indies. The army must be provided with air support, otherwise there will be a repetition of Greece and Crete, and Singapore will be grievously threatened.

5. The fall of Singapore would mean the isolation of the Philippines, the fall of the Netherlands East Indies, and an attempt to smother all other bases. This would also sever our communications between the Indian and Pacific Oceans in this region.

6. The setback would be as serious to the United States’ interests as to our own.

7.