The Stoics are frequently, and justly, charged with great arrogance in their discourses, and even in their addresses to God. They assert, however, the doctrine of grace, and the duty of praise and thanksgiving for the divine assistance in moral improvements.50 But there doth not, I think, appear any instance of a Stoic, or perhaps any other heathen philosopher, addressing his repentance to God, and begging pardon for his failings, or directing his disciples to do it. Indeed nothing can excuse their idolatry of human nature, which they proudly and inconsistently supposed perfect and self-sufficient. Seneca carried the matter so far as by an impious antithesis to give his wise man the superiority to God.51 Epictetus indeed was attentive enough to the voice of conscience to own himself not perfect:52 and he sometimes tells his hearers that they cannot be perfect yet.53 But even he at other times informs them that they are not inferior to the gods.54 The Stoical boasting will, however, imply less of personal arrogance, if we can suppose that those speeches, which so ill become human imperfection, were always uttered, as perhaps in part they often were, in the character of their idol, the perfectly wise and good man, which they owned to be merely an ideal being.55 At least, it may be affirmed with truth that they frequently mention themselves with decency and humility, and with an express confession of their deviation from this faultless exemplar.

§ 29. But then, where was the use of their favourite doctrine, that a wise man must always be happy? Might not a person, determined to follow his own inclinations, very reasonably object, "What is that to me if I am not, or to anybody else if no one ever was, a wise man? But suppose I were one; which is the better grounded argument? You must always be happy, and therefore externals are no evils; or, These things are evils, and therefore I am not happy. But Epictetus will say, You have a remedy: the door is open; go, with great good humour and thankfulness, and hang yourself, and there will be an end of your pain and you together.—A fine scheme of happiness indeed and much to be thankful for! Why, is it not the shorter and merrier way, instead of studying this crabbed philosophy, to indulge myself in whatever I like, as long as I can (it may chance to be a good while), and hang myself thankfully, when I feel inconveniences from that? The door is just as open in one case, as in the other; and nothing beyond it either pleasing or terrible in either."—Such, alas! is the conclusion too commonly drawn; and such must be the consequences of every doctrine not built upon solid foundations.

§ 30. Epictetus often lays it down as a maxim, that it is impossible for one person to be in fault, and another to be the sufferer. This, on the supposition of a future state, will certainly be made true at last; but in the Stoical sense and system is an absolute extravagance. Take any person of plain understanding, with all the feelings of humanity about him, and see whether the subtlest Stoic will ever be able to convince him that while he is insulted, oppressed, and tortured, he doth not suffer. See what comfort it will afford him to be told that, if he supports his afflictions and ill-treatment with fortitude and patience, death will set him free, and then he and his persecutor will be equally rewarded, will equally lose all personal existence, and return to the elements. How different are the consolations proposed by Christianity, which not only assures its disciples that they shall rest from their labours in death, but that their works shall follow them; and, by allowing them to rejoice in hope, teaches them the most effectual way of becoming patient in tribulation!

§ 31. The Stoical doctrine, that human souls are literally parts of the deity, was equally shocking and hurtful; as it supposed portions of his being to be wicked and miserable; and, by debasing men's ideas of the divine dignity, and teaching them to think themselves essentially as good as he, nourished in their minds an irreligious and fatal presumption. Far differently the Christian system represents mankind, not as a part of the essence, but a work of the hand of God, as created in a state of improvable virtue and happiness; fallen, by an abuse of free will, into sin, misery, and weakness;56 but redeemed from them by an almighty Saviour; furnished with additional knowledge and strength; commanded to use their best endeavours; made sensible, at the same time, how wretchedly defective they are; yet assured of endless felicity on a due exertion of them. The Stoic philosophy insults human nature, and discourages all our attempts, by enjoining and promising a perfection in this life of which we feel ourselves incapable. The Christian religion shows compassion to our weakness, by prescribing to us only the practicable task of aiming continually at further improvements; and animates our endeavours by the promise of a divine aid equal to every trial.

§ 32. Specifying thus the errors and defects of so celebrated a system is an unpleasing employment; but in an age fond of preferring the guesses of human sagacity before the unerring declarations of God, it seemed on this occasion necessary to observe that the Christian morality is agreeable to reason and nature; that of the Stoics, for the most part, founded on notions intelligible to few, and which none could admit without contradiction to their own hearts. They reasoned many times admirably well, but from false principles; and the noblest of their practical precepts, being built on a sandy basis, lay at the mercy of every strong temptation.

§ 33. Stoicism is, indeed, in many points inferior to the doctrine of Socrates, which did not teach that all externals were indifferent; which did teach a future state of recompense; and, agreeably to that, forbade suicide. It doth not belong to the present subject to show how much even this best system is excelled by Christianity. It is sufficient just to observe that the author of it died in a profession, which he had always made, of his belief in the popular deities, whose superstitions and impure worship was the great source of corruption in the heathen world; and the last words he uttered were a direction to his friend for the performance of an idolatrous ceremony. This melancholy instance of ignorance and error, in the most illustrious character for wisdom and virtue in all heathen antiquity, is not mentioned as a reflection on his memory, but as a proof of human weakness in general. Whether reason could have discovered the great truths which in these days are ascribed to it, because now seen so clearly by the light of the gospel, may be a question; but that it never did is an undeniable fact; and that is enough to teach us thankfulness for the blessing of a better information. Socrates, who had, of all mankind, the fairest pretensions to set up for an instructor and reformer of the world, confessed that he knew nothing, referred to traditions, and acknowledged the want of a superior guide; and there is a remarkable passage in Epictetus, in which he represents it as the office of his supreme god, or of one deputed by him, to appear among mankind as a teacher and example.57

§ 34. Upon the whole, the several sects of heathen philosophy serve as so many striking instances of the imperfection of human wisdom, and of the extreme need of a divine assistance to rectify the mistakes of depraved reason, and to replace natural religion on its true foundation. The Stoics everywhere testify the noblest zeal for virtue, and the honour of God; but they attempted to establish them on principles inconsistent with the nature of man, and contradictory to truth and experience. By a direct consequence of these principles they were liable to be seduced, and in fact often were seduced, into pride, hardheartedness, and the last dreadful extremity of human guilt, self-murder.

§ 35. But however indefensible the philosophy of the Stoics in several instances may be, it appears to have been of very important use in the heathen world; and they are, on many accounts, to be considered in a very respectable light. Their doctrine of evidence and fixed principles was an excellent preservative from the mischiefs that might have arisen from the scepticism of the Academics and Pyrrhonists, if unopposed; and their zealous defence of a particular providence a valuable antidote to the atheistical scheme of Epicurus. To this may be added, that their strict notions of virtue in most points (for they sadly failed in some), and the lives of several among them, must contribute a good deal to preserve luxurious states from an absolutely universal dissoluteness, and the subjects of arbitrary government from a wretched and contemptible pusillanimity.

§ 36. Even now their compositions may be read with great advantage, as containing excellent rules of self-government and of social behaviour, of a noble reliance on the aid and protection of Heaven, and of a perfect resignation and submission to the divine will; points which are treated with great clearness, and with admirable spirit, in the lessons of the Stoics; and though their directions are seldom practicable on their principles, in trying cases, may be rendered highly useful in subordination to Christian reflections.

§ 37. If, among those who are so unhappy as to remain unconvinced of the truth of Christianity, any are prejudiced against it by the influence of unwarrantable inclinations, such persons will find very little advantage in rejecting the doctrines of the New Testament for those of the portico, unless they think it an advantage to be laid under moral restraints almost equal to those of the gospel, while they are deprived of its encouragements and supports.