Here three British brigades stood until the afternoon of the 22d, and in this neighbourhood repulsed various attacks. We still held Arras, but the enemy gradually tended to swing round towards Béthune. The French light mechanised division guarding our western flank was forced from Mont St. Eloi, and the enemy tanks soon after approached Souchez. By 7 P.M. on the 23d the British eastern flank was under heavy pressure, and the enemy reaching Lens had encircled the western flank. Thus the position was precarious. We were hopelessly outnumbered, beset by masses of armour, and almost surrounded. At 10 P.M. General Franklyn informed General Headquarters that unless his force was withdrawn during the night its retirement would become impossible. He was told that orders to withdraw had been sent him three hours before. The operation had some temporary effect on the enemy; they recorded it at the time as “heavy British counterattacks with armour,” which caused them considerable anxiety.

In pursuance of the Weygand plan, Gort proposed to General Blanchard, who now commanded the northern group, that two British divisions, one French division, and the French Cavalry Corps should attack southward between the Canal du Nord and the Scheldt Canal. Two French divisions had in fact twice previously reached the outskirts of Cambrai, but on each occasion they were bombed and withdrew. In all these days this was the only offensive action of the French First Army.

* * * * *

In London we had no knowledge of the progress of this forlorn attempt at Arras to break the encircling line. However, during the 24th very reproachful telegrams arrived from Reynaud. The shorter of his two messages tells the story.

You wired me [he said] this morning that you had instructed General Gort to continue to carry out the Weygand plan. General Weygand now informs me that, according to a telegram from General Blanchard, the British Army had carried out, on its own initiative, a retreat of twenty-five miles towards the ports at a time when our troops moving up from the south are gaining ground towards the north, where they were to meet their allies.

This action of the British Army is in direct opposition to the formal orders renewed this morning by General Weygand. This retreat has naturally obliged General Weygand to change all his arrangements, and he is compelled to give up the idea of closing the gap and restoring a continuous front. I need not lay any stress upon the gravity of the possible consequences.

Up to this time General Weygand had been counting on General Frère’s army advancing northward on Amiens, Albert, and Péronne. They had, in fact, made no noticeable progress, and were still forming and assembling. The following are my replies to M. Reynaud:

25.V.40.

My telegram last night told you all we knew over here, and we have still heard nothing from Lord Gort to contradict it. But I must tell you that a staff officer has reported to the War Office confirming the withdrawal of the two divisions from the Arras region, which your telegram to me mentioned. General Dill, who should be with Lord Gort, has been told to send a staff officer by air at the earliest moment. As soon as we know what has happened, I will report fully. It is clear, however, that the Northern Army is practically surrounded and that all its communications are cut except through Dunkirk and Ostend.

25.V.40.

We have every reason to believe that Gort is still persevering in southward move. All we know is that he has been forced by the pressure on his western flank, and to keep communication with Dunkirk for indispensable supplies, to place parts of two divisions between himself and the increasing pressure of the German armoured forces, which in apparently irresistible strength have successively captured Abbéville and Boulogne, are menacing Calais and Dunkirk, and have taken St. Omer. How can he move southward and disengage his northern front unless he throws out this shield on his right hand? Nothing in the movements of the B.E.F. of which we are aware can be any excuse for the abandonment of the strong pressure of your northward move across the Somme, which we trust will develop.

Secondly, you complained of heavy materials being moved from Havre.