Yet I expect the forces achieving this are very modest. Why, then, are they not attacked? Why does not Lord Gort attack them from the rear at the same time that we make a sortie from Calais? Surely Gort can spare a brigade or two to clear his communications and to secure the supplies vital to his army. Here is a general with nine divisions about to be starved out, and yet he cannot send a force to clear his communications. What else can be so important as this? Where could a reserve be better employed?

This force blockading Calais should be attacked at once by Gort, by the Canadians from Dunkirk, and by a sortie of our boxed-up tanks. Apparently the Germans can go anywhere and do anything, and their tanks can act in twos and threes all over our rear, and even when they are located they are not attacked. Also our tanks recoil before their field guns, but our field guns do not like to take on their tanks. If their motorised artillery, far from its base, can block us, why cannot we, with the artillery of a great army, block them? … The responsibility for cleansing the communications with Calais and keeping them open rests primarily with the B.E.F.

This did less than justice to our troops. But I print it as I wrote it at the time.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

24.V.40.

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff informs me that [an] order was sent at 2 A.M. to Calais saying that evacuation was decided in principle, but this is surely madness. The only effect of evacuating Calais would be to transfer the forces now blocking it to Dunkirk. Calais must be held for many reasons, but specially to hold the enemy on its front. The Admiralty say they are preparing twenty-four naval twelve-pounders, which with S.A.P.1 will pierce any tank. Some of these will be ready this evening.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

25.V.40.

I must know at earliest why Gort gave up Arras, and what actually he is doing with the rest of his army. Is he still persevering in Weygand’s plan, or has he become largely stationary? If the latter, what do you consider the probable course of events in the next few days, and what course do you recommend? Clearly, he must not allow himself to be encircled without fighting a battle. Should he [not] do this by fighting his way to the coast and destroying the armoured troops which stand between him and the sea with overwhelming force of artillery, while covering himself and the Belgian front, which would also curl back, by strong rearguards? Tomorrow at latest this decision must be taken.

It should surely be possible for Dill to fly home from any aerodrome momentarily clear, and R.A.F. should send a whole squadron to escort him.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War, and C.I.G.S.

25.V.40.

Pray find out who was the officer responsible for sending the order to evacuate Calais yesterday, and by whom this very lukewarm telegram I saw this morning was drafted, in which mention is made of “for the sake of Allied solidarity.” This is not the way to encourage men to fight to the end. Are you sure there is no streak of defeatist opinion in the General Staff?

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.

25.V.40.

Something like this should be said to the Brigadier defending Calais: Defence of Calais to the utmost is of the highest importance to our country and our Army now. First, it occupies a large part of the enemy’s armoured forces, and keeps them from attacking our line of communication. Secondly, it preserves a sally-port from which portions of the British Army may make their way home. Lord Gort has already sent troops to your aid, and the Navy will do all possible to keep you supplied. The eyes of the Empire are upon the defence of Calais, and His Majesty’s Government are confident that you and your gallant regiment will perform an exploit worthy of the British name.

This message was sent to Brigadier Nicholson at about 2 P.M. on May 25.

The final decision not to relieve the garrison was taken on the evening of May 26. Till then the destroyers were held ready. Eden and Ironside were with me at the Admiralty. We three came out from dinner and at 9 P.M. did the deed. It involved Eden’s own regiment, in which he had long served and fought in the previous struggle. One has to eat and drink in war, but I could not help feeling physically sick as we afterwards sat silent at the table.

Here was the message to the Brigadier:

Every hour you continue to exist is of the greatest help to the B.E.F. Government has therefore decided you must continue to fight. Have greatest possible admiration for your splendid stand.