Where evidence could not be obtained, he was to continue in suspense. His understanding was never to be misled even in sleep, or under the influence of wine, or in a delirium. In this last particular, however, there is not a perfect agreement, and some authors are so very reasonable as to admit it possible for a philosopher to be mistaken in his judgment after he hath lost his senses.4
§ 7. The subjects of these several classes of philosophic exercise are the Appearances of things (images)5 By these Appearances the Stoics understood the impressions6 made on the soul by any objects, presented either to the senses or to the understanding. Thus a house, an estate, life, death, pain, reputation, etc. (considered in the view under which they are presented to the perceptive faculties) in the Stoical sense are Appearances. The use of Appearances is common to brutes and men, an intelligent use of them belongs only to the latter; a distinction which is carefully to be observed in reading these discourses.
§ 8. That judgment which is formed by the mind concerning the Appearances the Stoics termed Principles 
, and these principles give a determination to the Choice.
§ 9. The Choice
among the Stoics signified either the faculty of willing, or a deliberate election made of some action or course of life.
§ 10. As the Appearances respect particular objects, the Preconceptions 
are general innate notions, such as they supposed to take original possession of the mind, before it forms any of its own.7 To adapt these Pre-conceptions to particular cases is the office of reason, and is often insisted on by Epictetus as a point of the highest importance.
§ 11. By the word, which throughout this translation is rendered Prosperity 
the Stoics understood the internal state of the mind, when the affections and active powers were so regulated that it considered all events as happy; and, consequently, must enjoy an uninterrupted flow of success, since nothing could fall out contrary to its wishes.8
These which have been mentioned are the technical terms of the greatest consequence in the Stoic philosophy, and which for that reason are, except in a very few places, always rendered by the same English word. There are other words used in a peculiar sense by this sect; but, as they are not of equal importance, they are neither so strictly translated, nor need any particular definition.
§ 12. The Stoics held logic in the highest esteem, and often carried it to such a trifling degree of subtlety as rendered their arguments very tedious and perplexed. The frequent references to logical questions, and the use of syllogistical terms, are the least agreeable part of the discourses of Epictetus; since, however well they might be understood by some of his hearers, they are now unintelligible to the greatest part of his readers. Indeed, with all his strength and clearness of understanding, he seems to have been hurt by this favourite science of his sect. One is sometimes surprised to find his reasoning incoherent and perplexed; and his scholars rather silenced by interrogatories which they are unable to comprehend, than convinced by the force of truth; and then given up by him, as if they were hopeless and unteachable. Yet many a well-meaning understanding may be lost in a wood by the confusion of dialectical quibbles, which might have been led without difficulty to the point in view if it had been suffered to follow the track of common sense.
§ 13. The Stoic scheme of theology, as it is explained in Cicero and other ancient writers, appears, in many parts of it, strangely perplexed and absurd. Some, however, of this seeming absurdity may possibly arise from the use of strong figures, and the infinite difficulty of treating a subject, for which no human language can supply proper and adequate terms.9 The writings of the first founders of the Stoic philosophy, who treated expressly on physiology and metaphysics, are now lost, and all that can be known of their doctrine is from fragments, and the accounts given of them by other authors. By what can be collected from these, and particularly by the account which Diogenes Laertius gives of the Stoics, they appear to have held, that there is one supreme God, incorruptible, unoriginated,10 immortal, rational, and perfect in intelligence and happiness, unsusceptible of all evil, governing the world and everything in it, by his providence; not however of the human form, but the creator of the universe, the father likewise of all;11 and that the several names of Apollo, Minerva, Ceres, etc., only denote different exertions of his power in the different parts of the universe.12 It would be well if they had stopt here, but they plainly speak of the world as God, or of God as the soul of the world, which they call his substance,13 and I do not recollect any proof that they believed him to exist in the extramundane space. Yet they held the world to be finite14 and corruptible, and that at certain periods it was to undergo successive conflagrations, and then all beings were to be resorbed into God, and again reproduced by him.15 What they intended by being resorbed into God, as I do not comprehend, I will not attempt to explain; but I fear they understood by it a loss of separate personal existence. Yet some of the later Stoics departed from this doctrine of the conflagration, and supposed the world to be immortal.16 Indeed, there is often so much obscurity and appearance of contradiction in their expressions, that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to form any precise idea of their meaning. They who with impartiality read what the ancient philosophers of all sects have written on the nature of God, will often find cause to think, with the utmost veneration and gratitude, on the only book in which this important article is explained, so far as is necessary to be known, in a manner perfectly agreeable to the principles of simple, unperverted reason. For what it graciously teaches more than reason could, it confirms by such evidences of its authority as reason must admit, or contradict itself.
§ 14. The Stoics sometimes define God to be an intelligent, fiery spirit, without form, but passing into whatever things it pleases, and assimilating itself to all;17 sometimes an active, operative fire.18 It might be hoped that these were only metaphorical phrases, if they did not expressly speak of God as corporeal, which is objected to them by Plutarch.19 Indeed, they defined all essence to be body.20 An error of which, probably, they did not discover the ill tendency any more than Tertullian; who inconsiderately followed them in this very unphilosophical notion, that what is not body is nothing at all.21 His Christian faith secures him from the imputation of impiety; and the just and becoming manner in which the Stoics, in many instances, speak of God, should incline one to form the same favourable judgment of them; and those authors seem guilty of great injustice who represent them as little better than atheists.
§ 15. They held the eternity of matter as a passive principle; but that it was reduced into form by God, and that the world was made and is continually governed by him.22 They sometimes represent him as modelling the constitution of the world with supreme authority;23 at others, as limited by the materials, which he had not the power to change.24 Epictetus may be thought to incline to this latter opinion;25 yet his words are capable of a different turn. And there are, perhaps, more arguments in the writings of the Stoics, to prove their belief of the uncontrollable power of the Deity in the formation of things, than those which some unguarded expressions appear to furnish against it.
§ 16. Of all the philosophers the Stoics were the clearest and most zealous assertors of a particular Providence;26 a belief which was treated with the utmost contempt by the Epicureans.27 As this principle is, of all others, the most conducive to the interests of virtue, and lays the foundation of all true piety, the Stoics are entitled to the highest honour for their steady defence of it, and their utter rejection of the idle and contemptible notion of chance.28
§ 17. By fate they seem to have understood a series of events appointed by the immutable counsels of God; or that law of his providence by which he governs the world. It is evident, by their writings, that they meant it in no sense which interferes with the liberty of human actions. Cicero allows that Chrysippus endeavoured to reconcile fate with free will; and that it was contrary to his intention that, by a perplexed way of arguing, he confirmed the doctrine of necessity.29 Whenever they speak of God as subject to fate, which it must be owned they sometimes do in a very strong and unguarded manner, their meaning seems to be, that his own eternal will is his law; that he cannot change, because he always ordains what is best;30 and that, as fate is no more than a connected series of causes, God is the first original cause, on which all the rest depend.31
§ 18. They imagined the whole universe to be peopled with gods, genii, and demons; and among other inferior divinities reckoned the sun, moon, and stars, which they conceived to be animated and intelligent, or inhabited by particular deities, as the body is by the soul, who presided over them and directed their notions.32
§ 19.
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