Their Finest Hour Read Online

“A Constitution,” said Napoleon, “should be short and obscure.” The existing organisms remained intact. No official personalities were changed. The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of the Staff Committee at first continued to meet every day as they had done before. In calling myself, with the King’s approval, Minister of Defence, I had made no legal or constitutional change. I had been careful not to define my rights and duties. I asked for no special powers either from the Crown or Parliament. It was, however, understood and accepted that I should assume the general direction of the war, subject to the support of the War Cabinet and of the House of Commons. The key-change which occurred on my taking over was, of course, the supervision and direction of the Chiefs of the Staff Committee by a Minister of Defence with undefined powers. As this Minister was also the Prime Minister, he had all the rights inherent in that office, including very wide powers of selection and removal of all professional and political personages. Thus for the first time the Chiefs of Staff Committee assumed its due and proper place in direct daily contact with the executive Head of the Government, and in accord with him had full control over the conduct of the war and the armed forces.

The position of the First Lord of the Admiralty and of the Secretaries of State for War and Air was decisively affected in fact though not in form. They were not members of the War Cabinet, nor did they attend the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. They remained entirely responsible for their Departments, but rapidly and almost imperceptibly ceased to be responsible for the formulation of strategic plans and the day-to-day conduct of operations. These were settled by the Chiefs of Staff Committee acting directly under the Minister of Defence and Prime Minister, and thus with the authority of the War Cabinet. The three Service Ministers, very able and trusted friends of mine whom I had picked for these duties, stood on no ceremony. They organised and administered the ever-growing forces, and helped all they could in the easy practical English fashion. They had the fullest information by virtue of their membership of the Defence Committee and constant access to me. Their professional subordinates, the Chiefs of Staff, discussed everything with them and treated them with the utmost respect. But there was an integral direction of the war to which they loyally submitted. There never was an occasion when powers were abrogated or challenged, and anyone in this circle could always speak his mind; but the actual war direction soon settled into a very few hands, and what had seemed so difficult before became much more simple — apart, of course, from Hitler. In spite of the turbulence of events and the many disasters we had to endure, the machinery worked almost automatically, and one lived in a stream of coherent thought capable of being translated with great rapidity into executive action.

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Although the awful battle was now going on across the Channel, and the reader is no doubt impatient to get there, it may be well at this point to describe the system and machinery for conducting military and other affairs which I set on foot and practised from my earliest days of power. I am a strong believer in transacting official business by The Written Word. No doubt, surveyed in the after-time, much that is set down from hour to hour under the impact of events may be lacking in proportion or may not come true. I am willing to take my chance of that. It is always better, except in the hierarchy of military discipline, to express opinions and wishes rather than to give orders. Still, written directives coming personally from the lawfully constituted Head of the Government and Minister specially charged with Defence counted to such an extent that, though not expressed as orders, they very often found their fruition in action.

To make sure that my name was not used loosely, I issued during the crisis of July the following minute:

Let it be very clearly understood that all directions emanating from me are made in writing, or should be immediately afterwards confirmed in writing, and that I do not accept any responsibility for matters relating to national defence on which I am alleged to have given decisions, unless they are recorded in writing.

When I woke about 8 A.M., I read all the telegrams, and from my bed dictated a continuous flow of minutes and directives to the Departments and to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. These were typed in relays as they were done, and handed at once to General Ismay, Deputy Secretary (Military) to the War Cabinet, and my representative on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who came to see me early each morning. Thus he usually had a good deal in writing to bring before the Chiefs of Staff Committee when they met at 10.30. They gave all consideration to my views at the same time as they discussed the general situation. Thus between three and five o’clock in the afternoon, unless there were some difficulties between us requiring further consultation, there was ready a whole series of orders and telegrams sent by me or by the Chiefs of Staff and agreed between us, usually giving all the decisions immediately required.

In total war it is quite impossible to draw any precise line between military and non-military problems. That no such friction occurred between the Military Staff and the War Cabinet Staff was due primarily to the personality of Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary to the War Cabinet.